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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

JCSM-307-67

-1 JUN 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Draft Memorandum for the President on Future
Actions in Vietnam (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to:

a. JCSM-218-67, dated 20 April 1967, subject: "Force Requirements - Southeast Asia FY 1968 (U)"; JCSM-286-67, dated 20 May 1967, subject: "Operations Against North Vietnam (U)"; and JCSM-288-67, dated 20 May 1967, subject: "Worldwide US Military Posture (U)."

b. Draft memorandum for the President (DPM), dated 19 May 1967, subject: "Future Actions in Vietnam," which was submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment.

2. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the DPM. The DPM addresses two basic courses of action: Course A - adds a minimum of 200,000 men to the Southeast Asia commitment and includes major ground operations and intensified air and naval actions outside South Vietnam, especially against North Vietnam; Course B - limits force increases to no more than 30,000 men, avoids extending the ground conflict beyond the borders of South Vietnam, and concentrates the bombing on the infiltration routes south of 20°. The DPM generally implies that Course A reflects the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, Course A is an extrapolation of a number of proposals which were recommended separately but not in combination or as interpreted in the DPM. The combination force levels, deployments, and military actions of Course A do not accurately reflect the positions or recommendations of COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, or the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The positions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which provide a better basis against which to compare other alternatives, are set forth in JCSM-218-67, JCSM-286-67, and JCSM-288-67. Five major areas of concern have been identified in the DPM. They are discussed under the following headings:

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- a. Objectives (Part I, Appendix A).
- b. Military Strategy and Operations (Other than Air/Naval Operations in the North) (Part II, Appendix A).
- c. Military Strategy for Air/Naval War in the North (Part III, Appendix A).
- d. Domestic Attitude and Predicted Reactions (Part IV, Appendix A).
- e. International Attitude and Predicted Reactions (Part V, Appendix A).

3. ~~(TOP SECRET)~~ Objectives. The preferred course of action addressed in the DPM (Course B) is not consistent with NSAM 288 or with the explicit public statements of US policy and objectives enumerated in Part I, Appendix A, and in Appendix B. The DPM would, in effect, limit US objectives to merely guaranteeing the South Vietnamese the right to determine their own future on the one hand and offsetting the effect of North Vietnam's application of force in South Vietnam on the other. The United States would remain committed to these two objectives only so long as the South Vietnamese continue to help themselves. It is also noted that the DPM contains no statement of military objectives to be achieved and that current US national, military, and political objectives are far more comprehensive and far-reaching (Appendix B). Thus:

a. The DPM fails to appreciate the full implications for the Free World of failure to achieve a successful resolution of the conflict in Southeast Asia.

b. Modification of present US objectives, as called for in the DPM, would undermine and no longer provide a complete rationale for our presence in South Vietnam or much of our effort over the past two years.

c. The positions of the more than 35 nations supporting the Government of Vietnam might be rendered untenable by such drastic changes in US policy.

4. ~~(TOP SECRET)~~ Military Strategy and Operations (Other than Air/Naval Operations in the North). The DPM favors Course B with inadequate analysis of its implications for conduct of the war in Vietnam. The strategy embodied in this alternative - largely designed to "make do" with military resources currently

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approved for Southeast Asia - would not permit early termination of hostilities on terms acceptable to the United States, supporting Free World nations, and the Government of Vietnam. The force structure envisaged provides little capability for initiative action and insufficient resources to maintain momentum required for expeditious prosecution of the war. Further, this approach would result in a significant downgrading of the Revolutionary Development Program considered so essential to the realization of our goals in Vietnam. It would also result in the abandonment of the important delta region on the basis of its being primarily a problem for the Republic of Vietnam to solve without additional external assistance. (See Part II, Appendix A, for additional comments.)

5. (S) Military Strategy for Air/Naval War in the North. The DPM stresses a policy which would concentrate air operations in the North Vietnamese "funnel" south of 20°. The concept of a "funnel" is misleading, since in fact the communists are supplying their forces in South Vietnam from all sides, through the demilitarized zone, Laos, the coast, Cambodia, and the rivers in the Delta. According to the DPM, limiting the bombing to south of 20° might result in increased negotiation opportunities with Hanoi. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that such a new self-imposed restraint resulting from this major change in strategy would most likely have the opposite effect. The relative immunity granted to the LOCs and distribution system outside the Panhandle would permit: (a) a rapid recovery from the damage sustained to date; (b) an increase in movement capability; (c) a reduced requirement for total supplies in the pipeline; (d) a concentration of air defenses into the Panhandle; and (e) a release of personnel and equipment for increased efforts in infiltration of South Vietnam. Also, it would relieve the Hanoi leadership from experiencing at first hand the pressures of recent air operations which foreign observers have reported. Any possible political advantages gained by confining our interdiction campaign to the Panhandle would be offset decisively by allowing North Vietnam to continue an unobstructed importation of war materiel. Further, it is believed that such a drastic reduction in the scale of air operations against North Vietnam could only result in the strengthening of the enemy's resolve to continue the war. No doubt the reduction in scope of air operations would also be considered by many as a weakening of US determination and a North Vietnamese victory in the air war over northern North Vietnam. The combination of reduced military pressures against North Vietnam with stringent limitations of our operations in South Vietnam, as suggested in Course B, appears even more questionable conceptually. It would most likely strengthen the enemy's ultimate hope of victory and lead to a redoubling of his efforts. (See Part III, Appendix A, for additional comments.)

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6. (S) Domestic Attitude and Predicted Reactions. The DPM presents an assessment of US public attitude and assumed reactions to several occurrences. Its orientation is toward the risks involved in Course A. The difficulty of making accurate judgments in the area of public response is acknowledged, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff concede that their appraisal is subject to the same degree of uncertainty that is inherent in the DPM. Nevertheless, they are unable to find due cause for the degree of pessimism expressed in the DPM. The Joint Chiefs of Staff firmly believe that the American people, when well informed about the issues at stake, expect their Government to uphold its commitments. History illustrates that they will, in turn, support their Government in its necessary actions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that there is no significant sentiment for peace at any price. They believe also that despite some predictable debate a Reserve callup would be willingly accepted, and there would be no "irresistible" drive from any quarter for unnecessary escalation of the conflict. (See Part IV, Appendix A, for additional comments.)

7. (S) International Attitude and Predicted Reaction. There are several inconsistencies between the DPM and the published intelligence estimates. For example, from these intelligence estimates, there is no evidence that Hanoi is prepared to shun negotiation, regardless of the pressure brought to bear, until after the US elections. Also, it is estimated that US prestige will not decline appreciably if prompt military action is taken to bring the conflict to an early close. In the long term, US prestige would probably rise. The effect of signs of US irresolution on allies in Southeast Asia and other friendly countries threatened by communist insurgency could be most damaging to the credibility of US commitments. The DPM contains the view that there is strong likelihood of a confrontation between the United States and the CHICOMs or the USSR, as a result of intensification of air and naval operations against North Vietnam and/or a major increase in US forces in South Vietnam. Intelligence estimates do not support this contention. (See Part V, Appendix A, for additional comments.)

8. (S) Impact on US and Free World Armed Forces. Curtailment of air operations in North Vietnam (as proposed in Course B) will undoubtedly have an adverse effect upon US and Free World Armed Forces in the field.

9. (S) Most of the foregoing divergencies between the DPM and the stated policies, objectives, and concepts are individually important and are reason for concern. However, when viewed collectively, an alarming pattern emerges which suggests a

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major realignment of US objectives and intentions in Southeast Asia without regard for the long-term consequences. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are not aware of any decision to retract the policies and objectives which have been affirmed by responsible officials many times in recent years (Appendix B). Thus, the DPM lacks adequate foundation for further consideration.

10. ~~10.~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that:

a. The DPM does not support current US national policy and objectives in Vietnam and should not be considered further.

b. There is no basis for change in their views on the major issues in the DPM. These views are adequately stated in recent memorandums and reinforced herein.

c. The US national policy and objectives should be reaffirmed.

d. The US military objectives for Vietnam as restated in JCSM-218-67 support current US policy and objectives.

e. Implementation of Course B would serve to prolong the conflict, reinforce Hanoi's belief in ultimate victory, and probably add greatly to the ultimate cost in US lives and treasure.

11. ~~11.~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

a. The DPM NOT be forwarded to the President.

b. The US national objective as expressed in NSAM 288 be maintained, and the national policy and objectives for Vietnam as publicly stated by US officials be reaffirmed.

c. The military objective, concept, and strategy for the conduct of the war in Vietnam as stated in JCSM-218-67 be approved by the Secretary of Defense.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachments

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APPENDICES A AND B
TO JCSM-307-67

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1. OBJECTIVES

1. Abstracts:

a. DPM: (1) Proposed US objective is to bring South Vietnamese to choose own future; commitment ceases if SVN ceases to help itself.

(2) No stated military objectives.

(3) US commitment ceases if SVN ceases to help itself.

b. JCS: (1) Support US objective as stated in NSAM 288 - to ensure US commitment ceases if SVN ceases to help itself.

(2) Military objectives - make difficult SVN support of VC and cause RVN to cease direction of VC; defeat VC/RVA; extend GVN control over SVN; deter or be prepared to defeat CHUCOM intervention.

2. Specific Issues:

NOTE: Bibliography on page A-8

SPECIFIC ISSUE	DPM ADDRESS OF ISSUE	POSITION OF THE JCS/CHUCOM ON INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES	REFERENCES
1 US National objective - commitment	<p>Our minimum objective - commitment - in Vietnam is only to see that the people of South Vietnam are permitted to determine their own future. This commitment ceases if the country ceases to help itself.</p> <p>Our commitment is NOT to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- expel South Vietnam regrouping from South Vietnam.- ensure that a particular person or group remains in power, nor- ensure that South Vietnam remains in the corner of the world.- guarantee that the anti-communist government is a communist.- limit that the independent South Vietnam remain separate from North Vietnam.	<p>NSAM 288, 17 March 1966, states the US objective in South Vietnam as follows: "We seek an independent non-communist South Vietnam. The US National objective is to ensure an independent South Vietnam free of Communist subversion and able to determine its own government and national aspirations; ..."</p>	<p>JCSM 642-66 JCSM 218-67 JCSM 792-66</p>
2 Military objectives in Southeast Asia	<p>Both courses of action are developed without benefit of any statement of military objectives.</p> <p>The implication is that the objective for Course A with the associated force augmentation is:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- to bring additional military pressure to bear on the enemy in the South while continuing to carry out our present missions not directly related to combating enemy main force units. <p>The implication is that the objectives for the associated bombing strategy are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- to stabilize and to lift the morale of the people in the South.- to add to the pressure on Hanoi to end the war.- to reduce the flow and/or to increase the cost of infiltrating men and material from north to south. <p>The implied military objectives for Course B are to improve the negotiating environment and to stop infiltration.</p>	<p>Military objectives are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- to make it as difficult and costly as possible for RVN to continue effective support of the VC and to cause RVN to cease direction of the VC insurgency.- to deter the VC from continuing to receive North Vietnamese Armed Forces in SVN and force the withdrawal of NVA forces.- to extend Government of South Vietnam domain, direction, and control over South Vietnam.- to deter the Chinese communists from direct intervention in Southeast Asia and to deter the Chinese from direct intervention in Southeast Asia and to be prepared to direct such intervention if it occurs.	<p>JCSM 218-67</p>
3 Political Objectives for Southeast Asia	<p>The political objectives stated are those subsumed within the statements above regarding national objectives plus the following inferred political objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- initiate a "cool" drive to settle war.- lay groundwork for periodic peace probes with associated limitation of bombing.- seek possible compromise involving role in SVN for members of VC.	<p>See Appendix B</p>	

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11. MILITARY STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS (Other than air/naval operations in the North)

1. Abstract:

- a. **DIR:** The preferred strategy is essentially that of a continuation of combat operations at the current level with forces currently approved. US combat troops will be removed from the Delta. Increase utilization of RVN and third-country forces in logistical support role in order to release additional US forces for combat role. US efforts will be shifted from the pacification/MD role with the ARVN assuming increased responsibility for pacification and security. Plans on seeking accommodation through reduction of pressures exerted in the North and possible future political role for the VC in the South.
- b. **JCS:** The strategy recommended by the JCS provides a significant and broad increase in military pressure with which the enemy cannot cope; maintaining momentum and initiative which will result in a more secure environment in which the RVN can progress. Provide, through a selected calling of reserves, forces adequate to conclude the war in Vietnam and to provide a more flexible and responsive worldwide military posture.

2. Specific Issues:

SPECIFIC ISSUE	DPM ADDRESSAL OF ISSUE	POSITION OF THE JCS/DIR ON INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES	REFERENCES
1. Strategic Concept	<p>DPM preferred strategic concept:</p> <p>a. Continue ground operations with forces currently approved.</p> <p>b. Make more efficient use of US manpower by: (1) Army echelon the RVN; (2) making efficient use of US forces in the Delta; (3) increasing the use of US forces in the Delta; and (4) getting more support from RVN and other third countries.</p> <p>c. Primary responsibility for pacification and MD rests with the RVN.</p> <p>d. Initiate a "cool" drive to settle war.</p> <p>e. Lay groundwork for periodic peace probes with associated limitation of bombing.</p> <p>f. Seek possible compromise involving role in RVN for members of VC.</p>	<p>The JCS recommended strategic concept:</p> <p>a. Apply degree of pressure which is beyond enemy's capability to accommodate.</p> <p>b. Intensify operations so as to create a secure environment in which the RVN can progress. This is to be achieved with military civic action programs in coordination with GVN programs.</p> <p>c. Provide adequate forces to counter increased enemy pressure in Vietnam by:</p> <p>(1) Destruction of the enemy main force.</p> <p>(2) Locate and destroy district and provincial guerrilla forces.</p>	JCSM 218-67
2. Reserve's Callup	<p>The DPM preferred concept of operations, course B, does not include the calling up of the Reserves.</p>	<p>The JCS have recommended a selective calling of Reserves in order to more effectively fulfill US worldwide commitments while conducting the war in Vietnam so as to terminate it at an early date on terms favorable to US interests.</p>	JCSM 288-67
3. Strategic Flexibility	<p>The DPM does not consider the requirement for strategic flexibility and therefore provides no option for further military pressure or initiative in the Delta. The DPM does not consider the requirement for peace for a protracted period or take a turn for the worse. Further, military operations in Laos, Cambodia and North Vietnam are specifically excluded. ... If COURSE B is chosen, it must be made clear to the RVN and military leaders alike that the troop limit is firm and, short of an imminent military decision, will not be exceeded. The objective will be to make progress, even though it be slow...</p>	<p>The concept recommended by the JCS not only provides the resources for a prompt application of military pressure within South Vietnam but also provides forces to maintain the capability to assume the strategic initiative elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Such a posture would be consistent with the US commitment of Thailand in the event that action was threatened or for operations elsewhere on the periphery of South Vietnam. More importantly, this posture provides the US with the essential capability of strategic flexibility.</p>	JCSM 288-67
4. Progress of MD Efforts	<p>The National Liberation Front (NLF) continues to control large areas of the Delta, and there is little evidence that the revolutionary development program is getting any momentum.</p>	<p>The fate of the MD program hinges on the degree of security which is offered to the RVN and the progress of the revolutionary development program. Without assurance of a secure environment the RVN will not be able to achieve the necessary effort, and no real progress can be achieved.</p> <p>Progress has been about as good as can be expected from a government which at the start was weak administratively, lacked popular support and has been deeply involved in a war throughout its existence and suffers from competing programs sponsored by various US/GVN agencies. Great expectations for more rapid progress are not realistic under these conditions.</p> <p>ARVN has been slow in assuming its role in direct support of the MD program. There are now indications of increasing acceptance of and willingness to participate in the MD program. ARVN units are now in place. ARVN requires a continuous commitment of US/GVN forces in order to keep them from going against main force and provincial forces units in order to keep them from the MD area. In this respect, the US/GVN forces have been and are now conducting between 40 and 50 percent of their operations against these forces during the last 12 months. The need for this is graphically illustrated by the current situation in the Delta. The enemy has been slow to enter the country. The enemy in March alone directed 125 attacks against MD workers and teams which resulted in 231 workers being killed, wounded or missing. The MD program will continue to suffer until this situation is improved. The commitment of US/GVN forces to the MD program is a necessary condition for the MD effort to require increased US/GVN forces in order to adequately secure the MD effort.</p>	JCSM 288-67

SPECIFIC ISSUE	THE ADDRESSAL OF ISSUE	POSITION OF THE JCS/USC ON INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES	REFERENCES
Effectiveness of "cross-over point"	"The Army's... (1) The Army (JCS) is tired, passive and... (2) The Army (JCS) is tired, passive and... (3) The Army (JCS) is tired, passive and..."	While there is no single meaningful measure of the overall effectiveness of the JCS/USC, there are certain useful measures of the overall effectiveness of the JCS/USC. A recent OSD (SA) comparative analysis... (1) The Army (JCS) is tired, passive and... (2) The Army (JCS) is tired, passive and... (3) The Army (JCS) is tired, passive and..."	ON 277-67
Significance of "cross-over point"	"... (1) We are now past the cross-over point" cannot the military job be done without training... (2) We are now past the cross-over point" cannot the military job be done without training..."	There has been some speculation that the "cross-over point" has occurred. Figures on enemy losses, recruitment, and... (1) The Army (JCS) is tired, passive and... (2) The Army (JCS) is tired, passive and... (3) The Army (JCS) is tired, passive and..."	
Distinction between "big" and "other" war in Vietnam	"The 'big war' is the battle between the US and the North Vietnamese military... (1) The Army (JCS) is tired, passive and... (2) The Army (JCS) is tired, passive and..."	Exception is taken with the implied distinction that two wars are being pursued in Vietnam. This implied distinction... (1) The Army (JCS) is tired, passive and... (2) The Army (JCS) is tired, passive and..."	
Utilization of Forces	In addressing a possibly more efficient utilization of forces, the JCS suggests that... (1) The Army (JCS) is tired, passive and... (2) The Army (JCS) is tired, passive and..."	This statement is again indicative of an effort to separate the war into "big war" and "other war" categories... (1) The Army (JCS) is tired, passive and... (2) The Army (JCS) is tired, passive and..."	

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III. MILITARY STRATEGY FOR AIR/NAVAL WAR IN THE NORTH

1. Abstracts:

a. DPM

(1) Further bombing in the North will be ineffective.

(2) A better plan would be to concentrate the bombing effort on the North Vietnamese "funnel" south of 20°.

b. JCS

(1) The US should conduct a comprehensive and coordinated air/naval campaign designed to achieve well defined objectives.

(2) Continuation of bombing in the North would not be militarily advantageous.

(3) DPM requires major change in US policy, reversing the trend of gradually increasing pressures in the North.

(4) The air/naval campaign can be controlled independently of other elements of the war, to permit most effective application of this power in order to achieve objectives.

2. Specific Issues:

BASIC ISSUES	DPM ADDRESSAL OF ISSUE	POSITION OF THE JCS/CJCS ON INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES	REFERENCES
1 Relationship of Air/Naval War in the North to the Postulated Courses of Action.	Course A - Further expansion of the bombing program in the North, accompanied by buildup of forces and increased military activity on the ground, especially outside of South Vietnam. Course B - Limit force increases; confine ground conflict to within the boundaries of South Vietnam; and concentrate the bombing on the infiltration routes south of 20°.	The air/naval campaign against North Vietnam can be controlled independently of the other elements of the war. However, since all elements of the war are interdependent and complementary in their contribution toward attainment of the national objective, any reduction in the recommendation for continued bombing of North Vietnam would be a reduction in the pressure against North Vietnam. The direct linking of a reduced force level in South Vietnam with reduced air/naval actions outside South Vietnam, as discussed in Course B, appears doubly invalid as a concept.	OM 2377-67
2 Value of continued bombing in North Vietnam.	No major military targets remain to be struck in the North, excluding the port areas. The North now appears that it has reached a state of military equilibrium. Further destruction of the regime or occupation of North Vietnamese territory will physically reduce the flow of men and materiel below the relatively small amount needed by enemy forces to continue the war in the South. Our effort can and does have severe disruptive effects, which Hanoi can and does compensate for. . . . There continues to be no sign that the bombing has reduced Hanoi's will to resist.	The United States should conduct a comprehensive and coordinated air/naval campaign against North Vietnam. (1) Increase infiltration of external resources; and (2) increase interdiction of importation of resources in North Vietnam. Such an air campaign (1) should produce results which outweigh risks - political and military; (2) provide greater effectiveness, less cost in the long run, and clearer signal of US determination to Hanoi and the rest of the world; (3) should not cause CHICOM intervention; and (4) will cause snowballing pressures on Hanoi and the rest of the world. The United States should take significant action yet to be accomplished that would have the greatest impact on the RVN ability to continue the war is to obstruct and reduce importation of war-supporting materials.	JCSM 288-67 JCSM 218-67 JCSM 286-67 OM 2377-67
3 Hanoi insensitivity to increased bombing pressures.	With respect to added pressure on the North, it is becoming apparent that Hanoi may already have "written off" all assets and lives that might be lost in the war. They can and will hold out so long as a prospect of winning the "war of attrition" in the South exists.	Granted that Hanoi has taken many measures to overcome the effects of the air/naval campaign, nevertheless, the continued bombing of North Vietnam will continue to have a cumulative effect. The outcomes of the war, whether by political settlement or otherwise, will depend upon the cumulative effects of all US actions in Southeast Asia and the North Vietnamese willingness to continue. It is highly questionable that North Vietnam is willing to "write off" all assets and lives that might be lost when they could be saved by a move toward negotiations. There is, however, no indication that the North Vietnamese regime will accept a reciprocal military deescalation in return for a bombing reduction.	NE 11-11-67; DIA/CIA DOC 73-2138/AP-4 NSAM 328
4 Military Value to COMUSMACV of Shift in Bombing Effort	The lowest "ceiling" on infiltration can probably be achieved by concentration on the North Vietnamese. This shift, despite possible losses in the South, will reduce the pilot and aircraft loss rates by more than 50 percent. The shift will, if anything, be of positive military value to General Westmoreland while taking some steam out of the popular effort in the North. This shift of bombing strategy can, to military advantage, be made at any time, but the shift should be time to maximize the chances of getting Hanoi to negotiate.	In recent months the majority of our bombing effort in North Vietnam has been directed at Route Packages I, II, and III. For example in March, about 7,000 sorties were flown in these areas as compared to about 1,500 sorties in the remainder of North Vietnam. A shift in bombing effort to the remainder of North Vietnam would provide a significant increase in the number of sorties against the North Vietnamese Forces infiltrating into South Vietnam. However, a complete shift of effort would permit North Vietnam to concentrate its air defense system in the areas being struck, thus increasing our losses in those areas. Buildup in the northern part of North Vietnam and stockpiles there would be immune from attack, thereby making his problem much easier and releasing personnel and equipment to increase infiltration of South Vietnam. The shift would also increase the number of sorties in southern North Vietnam, which might destroy more infiltrating targets, but there would be more of them reaching this area to be attacked. The net result would not be of positive military value to COMUSMACV. The shift in effort will reduce air losses, at least initially, until the relocation of enemy air defense systems into south North Vietnam.	CS 2377-67 DIA/CIA DOC 73-293/AP-4 NSM 10-1-66

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BASIC ISSUES	DPM ADDRESSAL OF ISSUE	POSITION OF THE JCS/CJCS OR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES	REFERENCES
<p>5 Mining Operations in North Vietnam</p>	<p>The program they [CINCPAC & COMUSMACV] propose... would involve the virtual certainty of irresistible pressures... for the blockade of rail, road, and sea imports... for mining of the harbors against Soviet and other ships.</p> <p>Why not escalate the bombing and mine the harbors... on the gamble that it would constrict the flow, meaningfully limiting enemy action in the South, and that it would bend Hanoi? The answer is that the costs and risks of the actions must be considered. These are cost in US lives; cost in domestic and world opinion; and most importantly, the likely Soviet, Chinese, and North Vietnamese reaction.</p>	<p>The effectiveness of LOC interdiction cannot be greatly improved until deep-water ports are closed or neutralized. It will then be worthwhile to intensify the interdiction effort against other LOC's in North Vietnam.</p> <p>Mining of NVN deep water ports will disrupt the major avenue of basic economic and military support and force the enemy to overload more vulnerable routes by rail, road, and shallow draft coastal and internal waterway shipping. Mining of internal waterways will create choke points, backup traffic and saturate alternate routes. (See also Section V, Paragraph 4, this column.)</p>	<p>CM 2377-67 JCSM 288-67</p>

A-5

APPENDIX A

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IV. DOMESTIC ATTITUDE AND PREDICTED REACTIONS

1. Abstracts:

- a. DR: (1) Escalation makes war more unpopular and people want out of it one way or another.
 (2) Reserve buildup will be a divisive issue.
 (3) Force buildup will create pressure for war expansion.
- b. JCS: (1) The majority of the people, although frustrated with an apparently endless war, still want their country to honor its commitments.
 (2) In the long-term, Reserve buildup is more likely to be a consolidating force than a divisive one.
 (3) The American people have learned to accommodate to selective application of military power.

2. Specific issues:

SPECIFIC ISSUE	DRM ADDRESSAL OF ISSUE	POSITION OF THE JCS/CJCS OR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES	REFERENCES
1 Dissatisfaction with progress of the war	The Vietnam war is unpopular, and becoming increasingly more so as it escalates. Most Americans do not understand the war. All of them want the war ended and expect their President to end it successfully. Or else.	The vocal but minor segment of the American people who oppose US policy in Vietnam, both those in public and private life, do not speak for the entire population. It is more probable that the vast majority of the population want to see their country fulfill its international obligations. An American characteristic is to face up to a job and get it over with as soon as possible. Accordingly, since no end can be seen to involvement in Southeast Asia, there is naturally a certain amount of frustration. However, the sense of frustration is not severe enough to support a "peace at any price" attitude.	CM 2377-67
2 Political difficulty of Reserve buildup	Although increased force requirements will not lead to massive civil disobedience, a request for Congressional authority to call Reserves will lead to a divisive debate.	Callup of Reserves, a major increase in deployed forces, recommissioning of heavy F-4 ships, and an increase in air/naval pressures against North Vietnam would unquestionably evoke an immediate outburst from the vocal minority that already opposes US policy. However, in the long term, these actions should have a positive effect on the majority. National pride, spirit of unity, and patriotism should be aroused when the Government further demonstrates its resolve and determination to bring the war to an acceptable termination in the shortest feasible time.	CM 2377-67
3 Pressures for stronger action outside South Vietnam	The "hawk" faction will almost certainly impose irresistible pressures for stronger action outside South Vietnam.	President Johnson and other responsible officials have stated repeatedly that we want to avoid a wider war, and both the general public and Congress are well-conditioned to the policy of selective intensification of military power. Therefore, Reserve callup and/or controlled intensification of on-going actions (e.g., air/naval operations against North Vietnam) would not be expected to cause pressure for irresponsible escalation or for spreading the war beyond its current bounds. On the contrary, force buildup and graduated intensification of effort should quell the opinion held in some quarters that the United States is embarked on a "no-win" strategy. As a result, this should tend to discourage demands for higher levels of action than are militarily appropriate, or for withdrawal of US forces under less than honorable conditions.	CM 2377-67

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APPENDIX A

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V. INTERGATIONAL ATTITUDE AND PREDICTED REACTIONS

1. Abstracts:

- (1) Hanoi will not negotiate until after JC elections.
- (2) Intensified bombing will damage US image.
- (3) Increased forces and actions will bring US closer to war.
- (4) Mining Haiphong might cause severe reaction on part of US.
- (5) The USSR is the most probable "peace midwife."
- (6) A post hostilities role for the VC should be envisioned.

- (1) Appropriate application of power might well bring about negotiations at any time.
- (2) The USSR is not willing to negotiate with the US on the basis of the international image and position of the USSR.
- (3) Neither the US nor China are likely to seek a major confrontation with the USSR.
- (4) Same as (3).
- (5) The USSR might become a "peace shuffler" but US should not place primary reliance on this.
- (6) The Vietnamese, as such, should not place primary reliance on the USSR.

2. Specific Issues:

SPECIFIC ISSUE	DPM ANALYSIS OF ISSUE	POSITION OF THE US/CNCS OR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES	REFERENCES
1 Incentive for Hanoi to negotiate	Hanoi probably has decided not to negotiate until after the November 1968 US elections. Further continuation of our current policy may increase force levels and actions against the North are likely to change their mind.	There is no factual basis for estimating a timetable nor of identifying the critical decisions in the intelligence estimate decision to negotiate. It is generally accepted in the intelligence community that the US position of pressure - lack of successes in SWP, increasing loss of assets and escalation of burden in RVN, and constant reminders of US power and determination - ultimately will lead Hanoi to accept negotiation. Air/naval operations against NVN constitute important bargaining chips. This is where the US has best control of the intensity level. A large amount of time and effort must be expended that would be more likely to induce negotiation than would gradual escalation, since that would be much more difficult to accommodate.	JCSM 28B-67 ON 2377-67 SITE 10-12-65
2 International reaction to intensified bombing of RVN	The picture of the world's greatest superpower killing or seriously injuring 1,000 noncombatants on an issue which they have already disrupted, is not a pretty one. It could conceivably produce a costly disaffection in the American national consciousness and in the world stage of the United States.	World reaction would generally follow the pattern already established for past expansion of air operations over NVN. Those critical of US policy and what they regard as escalation of the war would be more vocal in their criticism; but overall opinion would remain favorable. There would be some sharp departures from attitudes currently held concerning the bombing, which would include demands for destruction of civilian populations. Some nations, especially the Free World nations, might privately, if not publicly, lend our actions as an indication of determination. Depending upon the intensity of the bombing campaign, there might be a move to concentrate efforts in other areas such as economic aid and other international organizations. Some nations may be moved to provide humanitarian relief and medical supplies, save for those powers now providing it; no additional military support is likely.	SITE 10-12-65 ON 2377-67
3 Effect of increased US determination	Increased force levels and actions against the North are likely to get us even deeper in Southeast Asia and into a serious confrontation, if not war, with China and Russia.	It is estimated that the Soviets are not prepared to resort to strong and direct threats of general war as we are. They are not prepared to provide Soviet programs by providing additional quantities and perhaps new types of weapons and equipment. Beyond supplying equipment, they could take certain other steps. They could attempt to recruit Chinese troops, they might believe that the provision of limited numbers of volunteers, or of aircraft, would serve as a warning without leading to a serious confrontation. It is estimated that the Chinese communists would provide a major troop presence in RVN under these conditions: (1) if the Ho Chi Minh Trail was cut off; (2) if there were a major ground invasion of NVN; and/or (3) if the North Vietnamese government collapsed. Short of these conditions, the CHINCOMS are expected to avoid a serious confrontation.	ON 2377-67 SITE 11-11-67
4 Sino/Soviet reaction to mining Haiphong	Mining the harbors would place Moscow in a particularly galling dilemma as to how to proceed. The USSR would like to see the US withdraw from a disadvantageous place. They might, but probably would hesitate in such a confrontation in Southeast Asia; but they might consider some action in Korea, Turkey, Iran, the Middle East or, most likely, Berlin. China could be expected to seize upon the harbor-mining as the opportunity to discredit the USSR. They might read it as an indication that the US was going to apply pressure until NVN capitulated, or that there would be an eventual invasion. If so, they might decide to intervene with combat troops and air power.	The mining or blockade of the RVN coast would be most likely to create an atmosphere of heightened tension between the US and the USSR, since such action would constitute a direct challenge to the Soviets. At a minimum they would try to quell further taking the matter seriously. They would also try to exploit the situation on the scene, since they do not have the strength in the area to confront the US with a major military challenge. Although they might want to show up on the US outside of Southeast Asia, it is considered unlikely that they would want to take the risk of provoking by such pressure a major and generalized crisis. If Communist China read the harbor-mining as falling under one of the conditions set forth in the foregoing para, they might feel compelled to intervene. However, they would not precipitate a confrontation solely on the basis of mining operations.	SITE 10-12-65 ON 2377-67

APPENDIX A

A-7

SPECIFIC ISSUE	DPM ADDRESSAL OF ISSUE	POSITION OF THE JCS/US ON INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES	REFERENCES
S. Soviets as peace negotiators	If we should decide to shift our bombing strategy, we should inform the Soviets quietly, make the shift without fanfare, then explain the reasons. The northern targets had been destroyed. Moscow would almost certainly have its information on to Hanoi, and might urge Hanoi to seize the opportunity to deescalate. Without having received an ultimatum, Hanoi would be in a better posture to answer favorably.	The genuineness of Soviet participation efforts would be determined by how they viewed their own interests at the time. On the one hand, the war is advantageous to them in many ways. It diverts US political and economic attention away from Vietnam. It employs a large number of US military forces-in-being and utilizes US military resources; it has adverse aspects for the USSR as it constitutes a small ally; further, the USSR has a strategic interest in the political life of the DRV. The USSR has adopted a new course of action which would force the USSR to choose between a serious gain by playing the new-war then not doing so. Since the Soviet can scarcely be considered unbiased, the USSR should use extreme caution in its reliance on this communication link with Hanoi.	SME 11-11-67
6. Post-hostilities accommodation of VC	"...to lay the groundwork by periodic peace probes, perhaps negotiating armistices associated with limitation of bombing and with a view to finding a settlement of the war involving, inter alia, a role in the South for members of the VC."	If we are to avoid the danger of winning the war and then losing the peace in Vietnam, we cannot realistically encourage the VC to integrate into the VC which does not have any interest in direct talks with the VC, including the DRV. There are two main reasons for this. (1) This would tend to degrade the status and prestige of the DRV, and, conversely, grant the VC status and prestige of the DRV. (2) It could lead to inclusion of a communist party in the political life of the DRV, and possibly the early formation of a coalition or "Popular Front" government. (3) It could tend to take the communists off their guard, and (4) it could result in a "peace" in the DRV campaign; and (5) it would create the impression of weakness and lack of resolve on the part of the US.	JCSM 792-66

INTRODUCTION:

1. USAN #30, 6 April 1967, Presidential Decisions With Respect to Vietnam.
2. OJ 2377-67, 28 May 1967, "Alternative Courses of Action."
3. JCSM-652-67, 23 August 1967, "Concept for Vietnam."
4. JCSM-792-66, "Draft National Security Action Memorandum on Vietnam."
5. JCSM-218-67, 20 April 1967, "Force Requirements Southeast Asia FY 1968."
6. JCSM-286-67, 19 May 1967, "Operations Against North Vietnam."
7. JCSM-288-67, 19 May 1967, "Worldwide US Military Posture."
8. DIA/CIA/DOC 88-203/AR-4, "An Appraisal of the Bombing of North Vietnam."
9. DIA/CIA/DOC 88-213/AR-4, "An Appraisal of the Bombing of North Vietnam" - January, 1967.
10. SME 12-12-69, 10 December 1969, "An Appraisal of the Bombing of North Vietnam."
11. SME 10-1-66, 4 February 1966, "Possible Effects of a Proposed US Course of Action" - DRV Capability to Support the Insurgency in South Vietnam."
12. SME 11-11-67, 4 May 1967, "Soviet Attitudes and Intentions Toward the Vietnam War."

APPENDIX B

ANALYSTS OF THE ORGANISMS IN VITAMIN

STYRENE

ABSTRACT

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... time has come for us to align the subgoals from our minimum objectives -- in Vietnam.

..... (16 March 1981)

... to continue effective support

CONTACT FIRST 2017:

... estimated at the 43.1 percent below the 1990 census, but more than doubled by 1995.

... the ... of ... in ...

SOURCE	CONJECTURES AS PUBLICLY PROMULGATED BY US OFFICIALS	SCOPE OF CONJECTURE				IMPACTED BY JOINT MILITARY OBJECTIVES (Legend: Military Objectives in JPRS 218-57 above)			
		POLITICAL	MILITARY	ECONOMIC	SOCIOLOGICAL	COS 1	COS 2	COS 3	COS 4
1. (U) US reply to Vietnam Appeal on Vietnam - 6 April 1965 (Department of State Bulletin, 26 April 1965)	<p>a. The Government of South Vietnam has requested the help of the United States in its defense against attack. In full support of this request, we have agreed to provide such help as we can. We will continue as long as we are needed, and until the aggression is halted. In these actions we seek only the security and peace of South Vietnam, and we threaten no regime.</p> <p>b. Peace in Southeast Asia demands an independent South Vietnam - security guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships to all others - free from outside interference - tied to no alliance - a military base for no other country.</p> <p>c. We will never be second in the search for such a peaceful settlement in Vietnam.</p>	X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
2. (U) Address by President Johnson at the Johns Hopkins University - 7 April 1965 (Department of State Bulletin, 26 April 1965)	<p>a. Our objective is the independence of South Vietnam and its freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves - only that the people of South Vietnam be allowed to live in peace and stability. We will do whatever is necessary to reach that objective, and we will do only what is absolutely necessary.</p> <p>b. In recent months attacks on South Vietnam were stopped up. Now it became necessary for us to increase our response and to make attacks by air. This is not a change of purpose. It is a change in that we believe that purpose requires:</p> <p>(1) We do this in order to slow down aggression.</p> <p>(2) We do this to increase the confidence of the brave people of South Vietnam who have bravely borne this brutal battle for so many years with so many casualties.</p> <p>(3) And we do this to convince the leaders of North Vietnam - and all who seek to share their conquest - of a single fact:</p> <p>(a) We will not be defeated.</p> <p>(b) We will not grow tired.</p>	X	X	X	X	Yes	MA	Yes	MA
		X	X			Yes	MA	Yes	MA
		X	X		X	Yes	MA	Yes	MA
		X	X			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
		X	X			Yes	Yes	Yes	MA

* Not Applicable

Appendix B

B-1

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SOURCE	OBJECTIVES AS PUBLICLY PROMOTED BY US OFFICIALS	SCOPE OF OBJECTIVE				REFERENCED BY JCS MILITARY CAPABILITY STATEMENT (BASED ON MILITARY CAPABILITY AS OF JAN 1965)			
		POLITICAL	MILITARY	ECONOMIC	SOCIOLOGICAL	GM 1	GM 2	GM 3	GM 4
	<p>(c) We will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of a ceasefire agreement.</p> <p>(d) We know that air attacks alone will not accomplish all of these purposes. But it is our best and praiseworthy judgment that they are a necessary part of the surest road to peace.</p> <p>e. I would hope that the Secretary General of the United Nations would use the prestige of his great office and his deep knowledge of Asia to initiate, as soon as possible, with the Chinese of that area, a plan for cooperation in increased development.</p> <p>d. For our part I will ask the Congress to join in a billion-dollar American investment in this effort as soon as it is underway. And I would hope that all nations of the area, including the Soviet Union, will join in this effort to replace despair with hope and terror with progress. The task is nothing less than to enrich the hopes and existence of more than a hundred million people. And there is much to be done.</p>	X	X			Yes	Yes	Yes	NA
		X	X			Yes	NA	Yes	NA
		X		X	X	NA	NA	NA	NA
		X		X	X	NA	NA	Yes	NA
3. (U) Statement by President Johnson - 27 April 1965 (Department of State Bulletin, 17 May 1965)	We have not changed our essential purpose. That purpose is peaceful settlement. That purpose is to resist aggression. That purpose is to avoid wider war.	X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
4. (U) Message to Congress from President Johnson - 1 June 1965 (S. Rec. 196, 89th Cong, First Session)	For our part, I propose that we expand our own economic assistance to the people of South Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos. I propose we start now to make available our share of the money needed to harness the resources of the entire Southeast Asia region for the benefit of all its people. This must be an international venture.			X		NA	NA	Yes	NA
5. (U) Foreign Affairs Outline No. 13, entitled "The US Stance in Southeast Asia," Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State - June 1965	<p>a. The nations of Southeast Asia, as with all other Asian states, should develop as free and independent countries according to their own views and toward increasingly democratic structures.</p> <p>b. The nations of the area should not threaten each other or outside nations.</p> <p>c. No single Asian nation should either control other nations or exercise domination over the whole area or for any major part of it.</p> <p>d. The nations of the Far East should maintain and increase their ties with the West in trade and culture as a major means of building together a peaceful and stable world.</p>	X	X	X	X	NA	NA	NA	Yes
		X	X			NA	NA	NA	Yes
		X	X	X		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
		X		X	X	NA	NA	NA	NA
6. (U) Letter from Ambassador Galtieri to the President of the Security Council, 20 July 1965 (US Mission to the UN Press Release 4620)	<p>a. The United States will continue to provide, in whatever manner and in whatever quantity, assistance to the people of the Republic of Vietnam in their struggle for independence, their sovereignty, and their right to choose their own government and make their own decisions.</p> <p>b. The United States will continue to assist in the economic and social advancement of Southeast Asia, under the leadership of Asian countries and the United Nations, and will continue to explore all additional possibilities, especially in connection with the great projects taking shape in the Lower Mekong Basin.</p>	X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
				X	X	NA	NA	Yes	NA

B-2

Appendix B

941103-214

SOURCE	OBJECTIVE AS PUBLICLY PROMULGATED IN US OFFICIALS	SCOPE OF OBJECTIVE				SUPPORTED BY JCS MILITARY OBJECTIVES (Keyed to Military Objectives in JCSM 210-67 above)			
		POLITICAL	MILITARY	ECONOMIC	SOCIOLOGICAL	OBJ 1	OBJ 2	OBJ 3	OBJ 4
12. (C) State Circular Telegram to all Diplomatic Posts (State 22658-JCS IN 33308) - 5 August 1966	<p>Essential Points of US Policy:</p> <p>(1) The United States is absolutely determined to continue its efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement to the Vietnam situation. The United States will not support any aggression, and will not withdraw from this position until the aggression ceases and South Vietnam is left alone to determine its own future free of outside coercion.</p> <p>(2) The US bombing of North Vietnam is restricted to military targets which are being used by Hanoi in support of the aggression against South Vietnam. The United States remains prepared to cease this bombing provided Hanoi takes reciprocal action.</p> <p>(3) The United States continues its offer for unconditional discussions toward a peaceful settlement, including the four points set forth by North Vietnam. The United States supports a settlement based on the essentials of the 1974 and 1966 Geneva Accords.</p> <p>(4) The United States does not threaten the existence of the regime of North Vietnam. We hold no animosity toward the people of North Vietnam. We are determined to bring about a peaceful settlement to the Vietnam situation and to help them to their government the prospect of cooperation in economic development when peace has been restored.</p> <p>(5) The United States does not want to maintain bases in Southeast Asia and does not intend to withdraw our troops from South Vietnam until its security and freedom of choice is assured.</p> <p>(6) The United States does not oppose the reunification of Vietnam by peaceful means. It is determined to support through the free choice of the Vietnamese people. Likewise, the United States does not oppose the neutrality or non-alignment of all the countries of Southeast Asia if that is their desire.</p> <p>(7) Our policy is limited: the United States seeks only to stop communist aggression; it is not attacking communism itself. We are in Vietnam to demonstrate the unprofitability of aggression and to prevent the spread of the communist system. We have come to the aid of South Vietnam, at its request and under the right of collective self-defense, in the face of a protracted aggression of a ruthless and relentless character. Without the application of our military power, the communist aggression against South Vietnam would have continued. We would be no chance of persuading Hanoi to leave its neighbor alone. The smaller nations throughout the world have a critical stake in this principle, and in the effort to maintain the integrity of South Vietnam.</p>	X	X			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
		X	X			Yes	MA	MA	Yes
		X	X			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
		X	X	X		Yes	Yes	MA	MA
		X	X			MA	MA	Yes	Yes
		X	X			MA	MA	Yes	Yes
		X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
13. (C) Briefing by Secretary McNamara to the Cabinet - 25 August 1966	<p>US military objectives are threefold:</p> <p>a. To seek out and destroy the main units of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese.</p> <p>b. To intensify the infiltration of men and material from North Vietnam into South Vietnam.</p> <p>c. To provide a screen of security behind which the revolutionary development of South Vietnam can take place.</p>	X	X			MA	Yes*	MA	Yes
		X	X			Yes**	MA	MA	Yes
		X	X	X	X	MA	MA	Yes***	Yes****

* JCS objective includes a task to defeat enemy armed forces in RVN rather than the SecDef "seek out and destroy" which, together with the JCS objective to force the withdrawal of RVN forces, is an apparent contradiction. SecDef objective does not include forcing the withdrawal of RVN forces.

** JCS objective supports the SecDef objective but goes beyond it with the addition of the task to intensify the infiltration of men and material from North Vietnam into South Vietnam. SecDef objective focuses on the VC insurgency. SecDef objective focuses on the more limited task of stopping the flow of men and material from RVN into RVN.

*** SecDef objective interpreted to mean that US forces have the prime responsibility for extending GVN control. However, the implementing tasks clearly indicate that the US forces assist the GVN in the RVN mission. SecDef objective limits the US role to supporting security so that the GVN may accomplish its mission.

**** The SecDef objectives have no parallel for JCS Objective 4.

Appendix B

941103-217

SOURCE	OBJECTIVES AS PUBLICLY PROCLAIMED BY US OFFICIALS	SCOPE OF OBJECTIVE					SUPPORTED BY JCS MILITARY OBJECTIVES (Keyed to Military Objectives in JCSM-21B-47 above)			
		POLITICAL	MILITARY	ECONOMIC	TECHNOLOGICAL		DN 1	DN 2	DN 3	DN 4
14. (U) Statement by Secretary McNamara to the Press in Saigon - 14 October 1966	The United States is not fighting to overthrow the communist regime in North Vietnam nor to destroy its government. We are fighting to prevent the spread of communism to South Vietnam to assure their own political destiny.	X	X				Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
15. (U) Manila Conference 25 Oct 1966	<p>a. To restore peace in SVN and the rest of Asia.</p> <p>b. To preserve the territorial integrity of SVN.</p> <p>c. To reunify Vietnam by free choice of all Vietnamese.</p> <p>d. To reconcile all elements of Vietnamese society.</p> <p>e. To withdraw all foreign forces as SVN military and economic forces are withdrawn, infiltration ceases and level of violence subsides.</p> <p>f. To achieve end of hostilities settlement which incorporates effective guarantees against further aggression.</p> <p>g. To force SVN to abandon aggression.</p> <p>h. To modernize agriculture.</p> <p>i. To achieve desirable land reform and land tenure system.</p> <p>j. To achieve economic prosperity through regional development.</p> <p>k. To overcome poverty, disease, illiteracy, social injustice.</p> <p>l. To create a SVN civil government based on honesty and justice.</p>	X	X				Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
16. (U) State of the Union message of President Johnson to a Joint Session of the Congress - 10 January 1967	<p>a. We are in Vietnam because the United States and our allies are committed by the SEATO Treaty to "act to meet the common danger" of aggression in Southeast Asia.</p> <p>b. We are in Vietnam because an international agreement signed by the United States, North Vietnam and others in 1962 is being systematically violated by the communists. That violation threatens the independence of all small nations in Southeast Asia and the peace of the entire region.</p> <p>c. We are there because the people of South Vietnam have as much right to remain non-communist -- if that is what they choose -- as North Vietnam has to remain communist.</p>	X	X	X	X		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
17. (U) Statement of Secretary McNamara before the House Subcommittee on Government of the House Appropriations Committee on 10 January 1967	<p>a. At the President's direction, the policies and objectives of the United States Government with respect to Vietnam are being reviewed by a high level committee of the United States Government. The committee will report to the President by September. Among the points he made were the following:</p> <p>(1) Ours is a strictly limited aim.</p> <p>(2) We are not engaged in a "Holy War" against communism.</p> <p>(3) We do not seek to establish an American empire or a "sphere of influence" in Asia.</p>	X	X	X	X		Yes*	NA	NA	Yes

Appendix B

B-6

SOURCE	OBJECTIVES AS PUBLICLY PROCLAIMED BY US OFFICIALS	SCOPE OF OBJECTIVE				SUPPORTED BY JCS MILITARY OBJECTIVES (Keyed to Military Objectives in JCSM 216-57 above)			
		POLITICAL	MILITARY	ECONOMIC	SOCIOLOGICAL	OBJ 1	OBJ 2	OBJ 3	OBJ 4
	<p>(4) We seek no military bases, no permanent establishment of troops, no permanent American "presence" of any kind in South Vietnam.</p> <p>(5) We do not seek the overthrow of the Government of North Vietnam.</p> <p>(6) We do not seek to threaten any legitimate interest of the people of China.</p> <p>(7) We do not ask of North Vietnam an unconditional surrender or indeed the surrender of anything that belongs to it; nor do we seek to exclude any segment of the North Vietnamese population from participating by peaceful means in their country's future.</p> <p>b. Let me say affirmatively and succinctly what our aims are.</p> <p>(1) We want a political solution, not a military solution, to this conflict. Similarly, we reject the idea that North Vietnam has a right to impose a military solution.</p> <p>(2) We seek to assure the people of South Vietnam the same right of self-determination -- to decide their own political destiny, free of force -- that the United Nations Charter affirms for all.</p> <p>(3) And we believe that reunification of Vietnam should be decided upon through a free choice by the peoples of both the North and South Vietnam, free of outside interference, the results of which choice we are fully prepared to support.</p>	X	X			NA	NA	Yes**	NA
		X				Yes***	NA	NA	NA
		X	X			NA	NA	NA	Yes****
		X	X	X	X	Yes	NA	Yes#	NA
		X	X			Yes##	No	No	Yes
		X				Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
		X				Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
						* SecDef objective providing for intervention is more limited in scope and therefore more in conformance with Ambassador Goldberg's point than is JCS Objective 1.			
						** However, SecDef objectives providing of a screen by US forces thus, by inference, deemphasizes the United States extending dominion and control.			
						*** Program in support of JCS Objective 1 tend to obscure this point of Ambassador Goldberg. SecDef objective calling for intervention is more limited, and supporting programs might make this point more evident.			
						**** JCS Objective 4 contemplates defeat of CHICOM aggression if necessary, while SecDef does not allude to this contingency. JCS objective is therefore broader in scope. However, the CHICOM contingency undoubtedly receives consideration though not mentioned by SecDef in unclassified testimony. Reintegration of the United States as individuals into the national life.			
						## The broader JCS objective gives rise to courses of action which tend to obscure the political solution sought. SecDef corollary objective of intervention is more limited.			
		X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
		X	X			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
		X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes*	Yes
		X	X	X	X	Yes	NA	NA	NA
		X	X			Yes	Yes	NA	NA**
						* The JCS objective could be interpreted to mean that US forces have prime responsibility for obtaining US control. However, the implementing tasks in support of US forces assist the GVN in R/D. The SecDef objective emphasizes the US support role.			
						** The SecDef objectives do not include a parallel for JCS Objective 4, although they undoubtedly receive consideration.			

SECRET

SOURCE	OBJECTIVES AS PUBLICLY FRAMWORKED BY US OFFICIALS	GOALS OF OBJECTIVE					REPORTED BY JOINT MILITARY OBJECTIVES (keyed to Military Objectives in 1965-66 above)			
		POLITICAL	MILITARY	ECONOMIC	SOCIOLOGICAL		OBJ 1	OBJ 2	OBJ 3	OBJ 4
Department of Defense News Release 22-57 - 24 February 1967	<p>a. The communists once again are proposing that we material sent South to be used against the people of South Vietnam, the United States fighting men and our allies should be moved painlessly in the quantities desired by North Vietnam. In the summer chosen by North Vietnam and over the infiltration routes most advantageous to North Vietnam. The United States provides nothing in the position put forward by the North. It demands much: a permanent cessation of United States bombing. The United States will continue to make North Vietnam a great free nation. The country will not stop the bombing and further military action. The United States will stop the bombing in return for appropriate de-escalation of military action by the North Vietnamese.</p> <p>b. None of these is our objective. Our objective is limited to securing for the people of South Vietnam the right to shape their own destiny, their right to choose the form of the political and economic institutions under which to do so without the threat, the pressure from external powers.</p> <p>c. Now, since that is a limited objective, we should seek to accomplish it at the lowest possible cost to this nation. The lowest cost in terms of dollars, but the lowest cost in terms of lives. That, of course, means we should take steps to avoid widening the war to North Vietnam, and we should take steps to minimize the risk of increasing the conflict and thereby increasing the cost to us in terms of American lives. And this is the foundation of our bombing policy.</p> <p>d. Now since that is our objective, we sought to accomplish three things by the bombing.</p> <p>(1) To raise the morale of the South Vietnamese.</p> <p>(2) To either reduce the level of infiltration of men and equipment from North to South or to increase the cost of that infiltration.</p> <p>(3) To make clear to the political leaders of the North that they will pay a price as long as they continue to carry on in their aggression of the South.</p>	X	X	X	X		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
25. (1) Address by Ambassador Galtberg to the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan, Tokyo - 25 February 1967	<p>a. The United States will negotiate on Vietnam only with the objective of ending the war and not merely to de-escalate.</p> <p>b. The United States sincerely seeks a political settlement rather than unconditional surrender, although it is not interested in negotiations with less than a full settlement in mind.</p>	X	X	X	X		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
21. (1) News Conference by Secretary McNamara in Washington, D. C. - 24 February 1967	<p>a. We have a very limited objective in Southeast Asia today - very, very limited. We are not seeking to destroy the Government of North Vietnam and certainly we are not seeking bases from which we can carry out attacks on Red China. We are not even seeking to establish relationships with South Vietnam in terms of which they will be our military ally, or in terms of which they will provide for us permanent military bases on the land mass of Southeast Asia.</p>	X	X	X	X		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
22. (1) News Conference by President Johnson in Washington, D. C. - 27 February 1967	<p>Our principal objective in North Vietnam is to provide the maximum deterrent to people who believe aggression pays, with a minimum cost to us - and to them.</p>	X	X	X	X		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
(1) Address by President Johnson to the Tennessee State Legislature - 15 March 1967	<p>a. Three basic US objectives:</p> <p>(1) An honorable peace, that will leave the people of South Vietnam free to fashion their own political and economic institutions without fear of terror or intimidation from the North.</p> <p>(2) A Southeast Asia in which all countries - including a peaceful North Vietnam - apply their scarce resources to the real problems of their people: combating hunger, ignorance, and disease.</p> <p>(3) A concrete demonstration that aggression across international frontiers or demarcation lines is no longer an acceptable means of political change.</p>	X	X	X	X		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Appendix B

Appendix B

B-5

941103-220

SOURCE	OBJECTIVES AS PUBLICLY PROCLAIMED BY US OFFICIALS	SCOPE OF OBJECTIVE				SUPPORTED BY JOINT MILITARY OBJECTIVES			
		POLITICAL	MILITARY	ECONOMIC	SOCIOLOGICAL	OBJ 1	OBJ 2	OBJ 3	OBJ 4
	<p>b. Three purposes in selective bombing of military targets in North Vietnam:</p> <p>(1) To back our fighting men by denying the enemy a sanctuary.</p> <p>(2) To exact a penalty against North Vietnam for her flagrant violations of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962.</p> <p>(3) To limit the flow, or to substantially increase the cost of infiltration of men and material from North Vietnam.</p>	X	X		X	Yes	NA	NA	Yes
	<p>Defend freedom in South Vietnam and at the same time continue the earnest search for an honorable peace.</p>	X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<p>24. (U) Owan Communiqué - 21 March 1967</p>									
<p>25. (U) Statement to the Press by President Johnson in Washington, D. C., upon his return from the West Coast (20-21 March 1967) - 22 March 1967</p>	<p>We shall persevere in our efforts to find an honorable peace. Until that is achieved, we shall of course continue to do our duty in Vietnam.</p>	X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Appendix B

B-9

941103-22/